GARRARD COUNTY COURT v. NAVIGATION CO.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appealo of Kentucky.
GARRARD COUNTY COURT v. KENTUCKY RIVER NAVIGATION
COMPANY.
If a tax is imposed upon a county or other limited portion of a state it must be
not only for a purpose public as regards that county but also local; and by local
is miant that it must give the county such special and peculiar benefits as amount
to compensation for the special burden laid upon it.
The improvement of a navigable river cannot be considered (at least under the
circumstances of this case) as such a local benefit to the people of the counties
bordering on it.
The distinction between navigable rivers and other highways for purposes of
local taxation, discussed by HARDIN, J.
Even if it be conceded that the legislature may lease a public improvement (as
e. g. the navigation of the Kentucky river) to a private corporation and authorize the adjoining counties to subscribe and tax the people to pay for stock in such
corporation, yet it cannot anthorize the imposition of a tax on such counties to
pay even in part the rent reserved from such corporation to the state.
Where a statute has in view a single object, and one of the means prescribed,
and without which the object cannot be accomplished, is void as beyond the power
of the legislature, the whole statute must fail.

T.HE Kentucky River Navigation Company was incorporated by
the legislature of Kentucky, March 1st 1865; its business, as
declared in the act of incorporation, being the "improvement of
the navigation of the Kentucky river and its tributaries, by
building additional locks and dams." Among other powers conferred by the charter, the corporation was authorized to establish
tells for the transportation of person and property over the Kentucky river and its tributaries within the influence of its improvements, provided the same should in no case exceed the rates
established by the Board of Internal Improvement, and in force
on the Kentucky river at the time. The 6th section of the charter provided, that "so soon as the said company shall have completed two locks and dams, they may give notice thereof to the
President of the Board of Internal Improvement, who, on being
satisfied that the same has been properly built and completed,
shall deliver to the said company the possession of all locks and
dams heretofore built by the commonwealth on the Kentucky
river, with all the lock-houses, grounds, buildings, and property
attached thereto, and all the tools and materials on hand for the
repairs of the same; and the said locks and dams, lock-houses,
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grounds, buildings, tools and materials, shall thereby be leased to
the said company for the term of fifty years; in consideration
whereof, said company shall pay into the treasury of this commonwealth, for the use of the sinking fund thereof, the sum of
$2500 a year," &c. And the 9th section of the charter provided,
"that the county courts of the several counties bordering upon
the Kentucky river, or interested in its navigation, may, on the
application of the corporation named in the first section, or of the
directors of said company, after its organization, a majority of all
the justices of the peace being present, subscribe stock in said
company and levy a tax on fte taxable property of said county
sufficient to pay the whole amount of said subscription in three
years from the time it was made; which tax shall be collected
in all respects as taxes for state revenue are now collected."
In April 1867, the County Court of Garrard county ordered
that a subscription of $100,000 of said capital stock be made by
an agent (with a condition not important in this case); and this
subscription appears to have been made.
At the January term of the Garrard County Court, a motion of
the Kentucky River Navigation Company, that a levy be made to
pay the first instalment of said subscription of that court of
$190,000, was heard; and the court, thereupon, refused to make
the levy.
Afterwards, at the April term, 1870, of the Garrard Circuit
Court, the corporation, on its petition filed in that court, and notice to the members of the county court, moved, the Circuit Court
to compel the County Court to make the levy, and the Circuit
Court after argument awarded a mandamus against the County
Court, commanding it to levy and collect, upon all the taxable
property of Garrard county, the sum of 833,833.33, to pay the
first instalment of said subscription of stock.
From this order an appeal was taken to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARDIN, J.-By the defence in the court below, as well as in
the argument for the appellant in this court, the power of the Circuit Court to coerce the levy by the County Court has been questioned with reference to the sufficiency and regularity of the
organization of the corporation, and its consequent right to accept
the subscription of stock, and the validity of the action of the
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County Court, to create a binding obligation on the county, subject to enforcement by that court, as a ministerial act; and, also,
with reference to the validity of the act of incorporation, as a
delegation of the power of taxation td the County Court, either to
subserve a general purpose of the state, or to promote a particular local interest of common benefit to the people of the county
to be burdened by the tax; and if any one of the grounds of
objection thus taken for the appellant is maintainable, although
all the others be untenable, the result must be a reversal of the
judgment.
Deference for the action of the legislative branch of the government/not less than a just and proper appreciation of the great
importanc6 and magnitude of the enterprise involved, would lead
us, if we could with propriety, and consistently with official duty,
to determine this cause by the solution of some one or more of
the minor and less important questions presented, leaving undecided the graver ones directly affecting the constitutional validity
of the charter. But the nature of the controversy is such as to
call for a decision on the fundamental grounds of the defence
relied on in the court below, and we do not feel at liberty to go
around a plain duty, merely because the task of discharging it is
an unwelcome apd an undesirable one to us.
It has been argued, that as the act of incorporation involved a
leasing to the company of the public works on the Kentucky
river,'which had been dedicated to the use of the Sinking Fund,
it was in violation of the 34th section of the second article of the
State Constitution, as operating to diminish the resources of that
fund; and also that it violated the 36th section of the same article in providing for the creation of a debt on behalf of the commonwealth, without a submission of the proposition to the vote of
the people; and still another objection is, that the act provided
for the appropriation of money or the creation of a debt exceeding $100, and was not, on its final passage, voted for "1by a majority of all the members then elected to each branch of the General Assembly, and the yeas and nays thereon entered on the journal," as required by the 40th section of the same article of the
conistitution.
These objections, though cogently urged in the argument, and
certainly entitled to grave consideration, will be waived, because
the necessity for determining the questions they involve will be
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obviated by the decision of another point, which we regard as more
formidable, and of more vital importance. Is the proposed -tax
prohibited by the 14th section of the bill of rights, in the words,
"nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use
without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him" ?
The power of taxation is certainly an inherent right of sovereignty, and indispensable to the very existence of government;
but another great fundamental principle is equally true, that the
constitutional guaranty of protection of property is not only- the
citizen's security against spoliation, though attempted under the
guise of taxation, but also against the imposition of unequal and
undue assessments on the part of the government. And while it is
undeniably true that the legislature, as the general depository of
power, subject to the limitations of the constitution, may provide
for raising public revenue and prescribe the objects to be provided
for, or aided by its expenditure, and may also, for particular local
objects and purposes, delegate the taxing power to the authorities
of counties or other municipal subdivisions of the state, the power
of imposing the burden of taxation, whether exercised in the one
way or the other, is still limited by the two important conservative principles of secuity against its own perversion or abuse, and
equality, as far as practicable, in the imposition of the burden.
The Kentucky river being, by legislative recognition, and in
fact, a navigable stream, for the improvement of which the state
had expended vast sums of money, by successive appropriations
since the year 1801, with a view to its general use as a medium
of inter-communication and commerce, and in which, by the act
of incorporation in question, the commonwealth retained valuable
interests, besides the sovereign right of eminent domain, it is a
question worthy of consideration, whether the taxation imposed
on the inhabitants of Garrard and other counties bordering on
the river should not be construed to be an enforced contribution
for fostering and promoting the general wealth and prosperity of
the state, rather than in the aspect of the merely local benefits to
be derived incidentally from it by the people of those counties.
And if this be so, the manifest inequality of the burden imposed
would at once demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the law imposing it.
But we propose to examine the question of constitutional
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authority to make the assessment, with reference to the local benefits which it is supposed would result from it to the community
taxed, and which certainly constitute the most plausible grounds
relied on for sustaining the judgment of the Circuit Court; fully
recognising, as we do, the principle as authoritatively settled by
numerous decisions of this court, that the legislature can delegate
to the authorities of any organized community in the state the
power of taxation for local purposes, and acting within its proper
sphere, the County Court- is a competent agency for levying the
tax.
As was intimated by this court in the case of Cheany v. ffoo8er,
9 B. Monroe 344, and also in The City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monroe 491, it is often a delicate and difficult judicial
question to determine what may be the precise limit of the power
of local taxation; but we perceive no valid objection to the rule
as stated in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of The People v. Township Board of Salem,
9 Am. Law Register, N. S. 489, that "if the tax is imposed upon
one of the municipal subdivisions of the state only, the purpose
must not only be a public purpose, as regards the people of that
subdivision, but it must also be local; that is to say, the people
of that municipality must have a special and peculiar interest in
the objects to be accomplished, which will make it just, proper,
and equitable that they should bear the burden rather than the
state at large, or any more considerable portion of the state."
Testing the essential question in this case by the foregoing rule,
it is difficult to see how the advantages of slack-water navigation
on the border of a county can be brought within the range of
local objects and benefits of such peculiar and common interest to
the community, as to render them proper objects to be attained by
local taxation. It is not every private, nor even every public
convenience, nor every facility for particular classes of business,
industry, or enterprise, however valuable to those who may seek
to profit by it, that is of general and peculiar benefit to a whole
community. - On the contrary, it not unfrequently happens that,
in the incessant struggle for wealth and financial ascendancy going on in a prosperous country, the greatest advantages to some
classes are correspondingly detrimental to others, who, from their
very weakness, deserve especially the protection of the government. The merchant and the banker, the manufacturer and the

156

GARRARD COUNTY COURT v. NAVIGATION CO.

distiller, may each represent large and valuable interests, and i
their own prosperity incidentally benefit others; but who can say
that to establish or sustain them in their respective pursuits, at
public expense, would not be a; flagrant exercise of arbitrary
power? And why should any particular class, who might seek to
profit by the advantages of navigation and commerce, be more
favored by the government?
The underlying principle of taxation, and, as we conceive, the
only safe and maintainable ground for upholding it, either for
general or local purposes, is compensation in some form resulting
from it to thos6 who may be compelled to bear its burdens. Women and children, and others unfitted for successful business pursuits, but owning the means necessary for their own comfortable
support, may look in vain to the prosperity or success of others
having the necessary talents or capital to profit by particular advantages, for a just or adequate recompense for the burdens of an
onerous tax, exacted to procure those advantages. But it is seldom difficult to discern the true grounds on which just and
authorized local taxation should rest, and to which, so far as may
be consistent with established precedent and prescriptive usage,
the safety of private property requires that it should be restricted.
All thoughtful and law-abiding members of an organized local
community will readily recognise the justice of enforced contributions, equally and fairly exacted, not only for the support of
their local government, but for the promotion of the common purposes of communication, health, and public safety and convenience, necessary for the public good, and in which that community,
in its organized form, has an especial and peculiar interest; for
each individual is presumed to be compensated for the tax he may
pay by his share of the common benefits secured. But it is difficult to perceive how this can be so with reference to the establishment of an ordinary private corporation, however great may be
its influence for enhancing the property of the wealthy, or stimulating or promoting any particular private business or pursuit.
We are aware that these views may seem, at first blush, to militate against some of the principles of the decisions of this court
in the cases of Talbott v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. 526, and of Slack v.
.Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, 13 B. Mon. 1, and
subsequent cases involving the power of local taxation in aid of
railroad companies. But an examination of those cases will show
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that a controlling consideration for treating railroads as proper
objects for local taxation is, that, partaking as they do of the nature of public highways, leading to or through a county or city,
they most efficiently subserve the purposes of a road for access,
travel, and transportation, and thus not only conduce to the prosperity of a local community, but like turnpikes, bridges, and other
public conveniences, they are considered objects of peculiar special and public local interest.
We have failed to observe in either of the adjudged cases
referred to, such analogy to this as to entitle them to the influence
of controlling precedents in this case. In one respect, it is conceded, the proposed improvement of the Kentucky river might
differ from the ordinary objects of private enterprise in its effects
on the local interests of the people of Garrard county. It would
enure to their convenience for.the purposes of travel and transportation by water. But we cannot regard this, in a constitutional sense, as a commensurable and adequate compensation to
the whole people of that county, as a local community, for the
imposition upon their property of the proposed tax of $100,000.
The increased advantages for travelling by water, resulting
from the improvement of the river forming one of the lines of
that county, which is rendered inaccessible for ordinary purposes,
except at a few points, by the natural cliffs and banks of the river,
cannot, we think, in any proper sense, be considered as equivalent to the ordinary facilities of travelling by convenient roads,
rendering all parts of a county accessible to the people in their
own chosen modes of conveyance for purposes of pleasure, or religious worship, or public or private business.
Navigable rivers, it is true, are a species of public highway,
and often of great value to the public, both as thoroughfares of
travel and channels for commerce; and in these, we admit their
analogy, in some respects, to railroads. But that analogy rather
exists with reference to certain objects of general commercial
interest, than the peculiar local benefit which, in this and other
states, have been recognised as constituting the true basis of municipal taxation in aid of railroad corporations. The navigation
of the Ohio river is of immense public importance, and, no doubt,
of great incidental advantage to the inhabitants of every county
of this state bordering upon it; but a proposition to improve the
present facilities for navigating that river by local taxation on the
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people of those counties, could not, we presume, be seriously considered as constitutional or just. Most obviously, such an improvement would be too general and comprehensive in its beneficial
results to admit of its accomplishment at the expense of the particular local communities mentioned, rather than the general publie to be benefited by it.
There is another reason indicating an important distinction between the improvement of navigable rivers and the construction
of railroads by private corporations for public use, and which
seems to illustrate the principle, that, generally, the former kind
of improvement is not an appropriate object for local taxation.
Unlike railways and other merely artificial means of travel and
transportation created by private enterprise, navigable rivers belong to the people in general as public highways, and must continue to be so, however improved; and "being subservient to
commerce, have, by the well settled doctrines of the English common law, been considered as things of common right :" Angell on
Water Courses 201. Being the property of the state, for the
use of all her citizens, why should they, for the purpose of improving them, be made the objects of discriminating or unequal
assessments, on account of mere incidental benefits resulting from
proximity to them, any more than the public buildings and other
property of the state, which may, under peculiar circumstances,
be more beneficial to some classes of the people than to others ?

The additions and improvements now being made by the state
to her capitol buildings, rendering the city of Frankfort more
attractive, and furnishing an increased assurance of the continuance of the seat of government in it, and thus operating to enhance the value of the property of its citizens, is no doubt of
much benefit to them; but surely this incidental local benefit
could constitute no sufficient ground for imposing on them, as a
local community, any part of the cost of these public buildings.
Whether or not the legislature may constitutionally provide by
general taxation for the improvement of the Kentucky river, or
any other navigable river of the state, is an ulterior question-on
which we have not intended to express any opinion in this case;
nor would we be understood as deciding that the advantages of
slack-water navigation to a local community may not, under any
circumstances, be such as to make them proper objects for mu-
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nicipal taxation, especially if the tax be imposed by the vote of
the people to be taxed.
It has been argued, notwithstanding the general interest of the
state in the improvement of the Kentucky river, that the proposed improvements would especially promote the interests of the
people of the adjacent counties by increasing the value of their
lands, and furnishing facilities for trade and lucrative employment; but that may be equally true with reference to many large
manufacturing establishments owned by corporations or individuals, which incidentally enhance the value of contiguous property,
and afford employment for some persons and a convenient market
for others. And as-in either case it is obvious that only particular classes of persons in a community can be materially benefited, it logically" results that, to foster either enterprise by local
taxation, would involve the appropriation of private property to
public use without just compensation; or what is worse, taking
the property of one class of the people and giving it to another.
While we recognise the decisions of this court, to which we
have referred, as authoritatively settling the questions they involve
with reference to railroads as objects to be attained by the aid of
municipal taxation, we do not feel authorized to regard them as
precedents for sustaining by that means any general system of
internal improvement; and if the question of power, with reference to railroad corporations, were altogether a new one, we
might, upon very high authority, "entertain great doubts and
serious hesitations in regard to the practice coming appropriately
within the range of municipal- powers and duties :" Redfield on
Railways 535.
There is yet another aspect of this case, which presents a grave
if not an insurmountable cause of objection to the validity of the
taxing power sought to be enforced. The act of incorporation
does not stop with providing for local assessments for extending
slack-water navigation along the borders of the counties to be
affected by building the additional locks and dams contemplated;
but it goes further, and operates in effect to impose on the people
of those counties contributive responsibility to the state for an
annual rent of $2500 a year, foi the public works already constructed and in operation on the river, for a term of fifty years.
If it should be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the tax
can be upheld on the ground of its local benefits to the extent of
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the proposed additional works, it is difficult to discover any maintainable ground for coercing the local communities concerned to
become parties to this legislative contract between the corporation and the state. To admit the power of a county court or
other municipal authority, with or without legislativesanction, to
assess private property in aid of any scheme or enterprise, instituted by a private corporation or any individual, not the subject
of peculiar local interest to the people to be burdened, would
involve the surrender of the great principles, that the right of
property is before and higher than even any constitutional sanction, and that no civil government is entitled, in ordinary cases,
and as a general rule, to regulate the use of property in the hands
of its owners.
If the facilities for navigating the Kentucky river, already
provided by the commonwealth at great public expense, are of
local benefit to the people of Garrard county, we do not see how
any peculiar local interest of that community would be promoted
by transferring the management of the public works from the
state to a private corporation. Therefore, considering the contract with the state as disconnected from the additional improvement of the navigation of the river, the imposition of a share of
its responsibilities and risks on the people of Garrard county, by
compelling them to take stock in the company, could not be
sustained.
It may be said, however, that, although the County Court could
not bind the people of the county as a contracting party with the
state, that fact did not vitiate the subscription of stock for the
other purposes contemplated by the act of incorporation. -But
while it is a rule of law that if a statute attempts to accomplish
two or more objects, and is void as to one, it may still be valid as
to the others; yet if its purpose is to accomplish a single object
only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail,
unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the
invalid portion. "And if they are so mutually connected with
and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or
compensations for each othei, as to warrant the belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently; then if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
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provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them :" Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 178.
But whatever might be the effect of the contract with the state,
on the validity of the subscription of stock by the County Court,
we are satisfied, for the other reasons already sufficiently indicated, that the subscription was unauthorized, and consequently
the judgment, awarding the mandamus, is erroneous.
Wherefore the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded,
with directions to dismiss the motion.
The foregoing opinion of a court of
high authority seems to us to present the
points upon which this class of cases
should be made to turn, with great clearhess and most unquestionable fairness
and truth.
1. That upon principle taxation should
not be resorted to in aid of local interests, upon the mere ground of incidental advantage, unless the interests
themselves are under the control of the
particular public authority imposing the
burden or tax. Thus it will not be
allowable for towns to impose taxes for
the erection or maintenance of county
buildings, such as court-houses and jails,
upon the ground that such buildings
confer some incidental benefit upon the
inhabitants of the town. In strictness
the authority imposing the tax should
have the duty of erecting and maintaining the objects for which the taxation is
imposed. For instance the state capitols,
the expenses of the legislature and of
the state officers, must be borne by state
taxation. And we are not aware that
any municipality has ever successfully
attempted to maintain the right of imposing taxes upon the persons or propetty, where state institutions were built
or maintained, in aid of such institutiorts, upon the ground of incidental
benefit thence -derived. And the same
will hold true in regard to county buildings. But local taxation by the proper
authority has always been held allowable upon the ground of special local
VOL. XIX.-l 1

benefit. City improvements have been
carried on, either wholly or in part, upon
this ground. This question is largely
discussed, in a very careful opinion, by
BIGELow, C. J., in Dorgan v. n'e City
of Boston, 12 Allen 223, and the decisions somewhat extensively quoted in
the opinion, as well as in the arguments
of counsel. We may refer ta Lowell Y.
Oliver, 8 Allen 247; State v. New Orleans Nav. Co., I1 Martin (La.) 309 ;
Burnett v. Sacramento. 12 Cal. 76, and
later cases in the same state. See also
Egyptian Levee Co. v. lardin, 27 Mo.
495 ; Nicwls v. City of Bridgeport, 23
Conn. 189 ; Thte People v. The City of
Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 ; Guilford v. The
Supervisors,4-c., 13 N. Y. 143 ; Brewster
v. The City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116.
2. Taxation should only be resorted
to for objects or purposes which are of a
public character, and where the investment is for the advancement of some
object exclusively of that character.
And in addition to this the principle of
taxation requires that the imposition
should be made rateably, upon all the
property and persons, within the range
of the operation of such public interest
or object. We do not claim that all
this is indispensable, always, to the legal
validity of taxation. The taxing power,
like all other governmental powers,
must be allowed a wide range of discretion, in carrying its functions into operation. But such powers are not absolutely without limit. There must be
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some limit upon the legislature, as well
as upon all other depositaries of power.
And it seems to us not consistent with
the principles of free govetnment to
hold, as some very able and sensible
writers seem to do, that there is no limit
upon legislative authority except what is
found in our national and state constitutions. But we shall refer to this again.
3. The great question involved in all
these cases seems to be how far and in
what mode it is competent for the public
authorities to sustain or encourage objects
and enterprises of an essentially private
character, by means of public taxation.
And this inquiry, upon principle, seems
to us to be the great question in the
principal case; or at all events, it is the
question underlying all the others. The
court, after suggesting the radical difficulty in the question and the direction
they might feel compelled to take, upon
the general subject, if the question were
res integra, very properly conclude, that
there is a fatal difficulty in the present
case ; and this is, that the counties subjected to the imposition by way of subscription to the capital stock of a private
corporation, are beyond this, by the
same legislative provisions made or attempted to be made, responsible as
guarantors of the faithful performance
on the part of the corporation of the
stipulations of the lease, as to rent.
This seems indeed a fatal objection to
the whole provision ; but, in principle, it
is not essentially different from making
the counties members of the corporation,
by compelling them to subscribe for
shares, through the action of the county
court. And if they may thus be made
to assume the responsibility of members
of the corporation, it seems only another
step in the same direction, to compel
them to stand as sureties for the undertakings of the corporation. All persons are in some sense responsible for
the undertakings of all private corporations of which they become members;

always to the extent of their shares,
and sometimes beyond that. The legislature may always make the members
of a corporation responsible for its future
undertakings.
Something not entirely dissimilar to
this farming out of public works to private corporations has been attempted in
England, by creating a species of quasi
public corporations, of a grade below
that of municipalities, to have charge of
some particular public interest. Of this
class are the Thames Conservancy and
the Mersey Docks, and many others,
which have no functions beyond the
particular objects of their creation ; to
build an embankment along the shores
of the Thames, or to create and maintai suitable docks for the harbor of
Liverpool. Perhaps such public corporations, for the accomplishment of
particular public objects, are less objectionable than allowing the municipalities to become members of private
business corporations. And in the former case there is no attempt to resort to
anything like general taxation, as there
is where the counties or towns are allowed to subscribe for the stock of railways and canals and corporations for
improving the navigation of large
rivers.
There are differences of opinion
among able jurists and learned judges
in regard to there being any limitation
upon the power of the legislature, either
state or national, in regard to taxation,
except what is found in express terms or
by reasonable implication, in the letter
of the constitution. Many of the declarations from the bench seem to carry
the implication, that there is no such
limitation except as found in the terms
of the written constitution of the state,
or nation, as the case may be. Of
course this is not intended to exclude
those limitations which result from the
apportionment between the state and national governments of different interests
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and subject-matters, as forming the ba- poses; they were never attempted to be
sis of jurisdiction. It will be implied justified upon any other ground.
in all such general statements, that the
But upon the general question of resubject-matter is of national or state strictive limitations upon the power of
cognisance, as the case may be. But the legislature in the imposition of taxes,
beyond this condition it seems to be sup- as before stated, we suppose very few
posed by many, that the legislature is will really attempt to maintain, that
absolutely omnipotent, in the matter of there are positively none except such as
taxation, unless restricted by the express are found in the written constitutions.
or implied provisions of the constitu- There must, of course, be the same limition : GnovEn, J., in Litchfield v. Ver- tations which exist in regard to legisnon, 41 N. Y. 123; MAsoN, J., in Peo- lation, that it must come fairly within
ple, 4-c., v. Lawrence, Id. 137. But we do the definition of the term, as being a
not suppose, that any one dan claim, seri- legislative act or function. Legislation
ously, that the power of taxation is abso- does not embrace juaicial decrees, or
lutely unlimited, except by the restraints mere despotic orders or assessments,
of the written constitutions of the states or such as a military conqueror might
the nation. The most incomprehensible make. The legislative power can only
exercise of the taxing power, which has exercise functions coming fairly within
ever arisen in our country, was in re- the import of laws. So also of taxation ;
gard to bounties, and other expedients, it must be a tax and not a mere penalty
resorted to by the towns, to raise their or extortion. And it has never seemed
quota of soldiers for the army of the to us, that those general constitutional
United States during the late war. provisions, found in most of the state
There are decisions, more or less, in al- constitutions, that taxation shall be
most all the states, upon this subject, "proportional and reasonable," Mass.
and all in the same direction;' with Const. pt. 2, c. 1, 1, art. 4, really add
occasional dissenting opinions from dif- anything, to what is fairly and necessaferent judges : State v. .. ackson, 2 Vroom rily implied by the most obvious import
189, Viw DYr, J., dissenting; AMdY.
of the term t taxation." It might be
Gldm, 52 Penna. St. 432 ; Weister v. somewhat difficult to raise such an issue
Thrade, Id. 474; WoonwAD, C. J., and upon the word "reasonable," as would
ThoxPsozf, J., dissenting; Trustees of
not be overriden and broken down by
Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio N. S. 38 ; and the necessary discretion of the legislawe might refer to many more of the same ture. But upon the word "proportional"
class. But we do not regard these de- there is less difficulty. This provision
cisions as affording much aid in deciding must imply, that all persons or property
other cases. They were affected, to taxed shall be assessed proportionally ;
large extent, by a stringent necessity, and generally, no doubt, it implies,
more or less disqualifying all classes that all persons and property, within the
from the ability to weigh the questions district assessed, shall be included in the
with that degree of dispassionate con- assessment. And the same is implied
sideration, so indispensable in the deter- in the very word "taxation."
It could
mination of grave and difficult constitu- not fairly be claimed, that an arbitrary
tional questions; and cannot therefore decree of the legislature, that all taxes
fail, in the end, to be regarded by all, as should be assessed upon persons of the
of a class sui generis, and not authority greatest wealth, or the highest incomes,
in any others. But these all went upon until the requisite amount were raised,
the ground of being for municipal pur- was taxation. It would be no more
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taxation than the ravages of the pirate
or the highwayman. For they often
pursue their vocation under some method
and with some show of mercy and forbearance, not depriving their victims of
all necessaries. And the fact of all
assessments being made upon those most
able to bear them, or that the plan
adopted was really the most just and
salutary, all things considered, would
not make any such arbitrary exaction
to become taxation. So that in fact
taxation and proportional taxation are
the same thing. But this will not exclude the right to impose the burden of
creating or maintaining such improvements as are special benefits to particular persons or estates upon the persons
or property benefited in the ratio of the
benefit conferred: Hammett v. Philadelphia, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 411 ;
Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28
Cal. 345; Walsh v. Mathews, 29 Id.
123; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas
186; Howell v. The City of Buffalo, 37
N. Y. 267. But it has been held that
it is not competent to enforce any portion of an assessment for improvements
upon the land assessed, by proceedings
against the person of the owner: Taylor
v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; two judges
dissenting.
We might pursue this inquiry much
further, but we trust enough has been
said to show that the legislatures in the
American states are only invested with
such functions and powers as are distinctively of a legislative character; and
that within this there is no just ground
for attempting to embrace arbitrary impositions, under the name of taxation;
that the word ,ltaxation," ex vi termini,
imports only such impositions as are
made rateably upon all persons or property, or both, which come fairly within
the range of the supposed benefit or
duty.
This division ofthe districts of taxation
is best expressed by general and local.

And we suppose there is no more doubt
or difficulty here, than in regard to the
matter of the assessment bding made
rateably. It is clearly not competent for
the legislature to impose taxes upon
particular districts for general purposes, as that some particular county
should pay all the expense of supporting the courts or the legislature. This
has been too often decided and is too obvious to require the citation of authority.
Such an assessment would become a
mere arbitrary exaction, and would
thereby lose its character of taxation.
But there will sometimes, no doubt,
arise difficulties in determining what objects are local and what not. As a
general thing all objects which may exist in any portion of the state as joint
stock corporations, gas companies, water companies, may be regarded as of
general public interest. The same may
be said of professional pursuits and
other business functions. And whenever an excise or duty is imposed upon
any such function or privilege, it may be
directed to be paid either into the general treasury or that of the particular
local jurisdiction where the function is
exercised. So too of any tax required
of foreign corporations doing business
in another state or jurisdiction : Attorney-General v. Bay Sate Mining Co., 99
Mass. 148.
Finally, it must be an interest of a public character to justify the legislature in
imposing taxes for its support. This
seems to be conceded, in terms, on all
hands, but practically evaded, by extending taxation to all those subjects which
the legislature or the state might undertake and carry forward by means, either
of general or local taxation. Hence it
seems to be supposed, that because the
nation assumes to subsidize extended
lines of railway, through uncultivated
regions of the public domain, by appropriating for that purpose portions of the
territory, which is only what any pro-
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perty-owner might do; or because the
state or nation may confessedly build
and maixtain railways at the public expense, therefore it is equally competent
to aid private enterprises of that character by means of local taxation. If that
rule were to be pushed to its logical resuits it would bd"made to bring a very
large number of private enterprises
within the range of aid from public
taxation. If the thing is allowable to
that extent, it might be made to embrace aqueduct companies and gas com-
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panies perhaps, and turnpike companies
and plank-road companies, and hotel
companies, and many other interests,
which the public interest might justify
creating at the public expense, provided
they could not be accomplished in any
other mode. In some portions of the
country it is claimed to embrace steam
grain-mills and saw-mills ! But we have
already said more than we intended.
We should be rejoiced if any one could
point us to any safe limit of taxation in
I. F. R.
this direction.

and Appeals of New Jersey.

THE PATERSON AND NEWARK RAILROAD COMPANY v.
FREDERICK STEVENS.
The state is the absolute owner of the land below high-water mark under all
navigable water within its territorial limits, and such land can be granted to any
one, either public or private, without making comipensation to the owner of the
shose.
] y the local custom of the state the shore owner can reclaim the land between
higk and low water marks, but such privilege is a mere license which the legislature may revoke at any time before execution.
The rights conferred by the Wharf Act, are also revocable before execution by
the land owner.
A statute giving a railroad company the right to lay their road along a river
and to acquire the rights of the shore owners, will not be construed to give by
implication, the right to take the land of the state lying below the high-water
line.

THIS was a writ of error to the Essex Circuit.
in case.

The suit was

The declaration stated that the plaintiff (defendant in

error) was the owner in possession of a certain tract of land adjoining the Passaic river, and that said river was a public navigable river and in it the tide ebbed and flowed. That the
plaintiff had enjoyed full access from his lands to the river, for

the purpose of washing, bathing, watering his cattle, for fishing
and navigating, and that the defendants have placed obstructions

along the entire water front of said lands, consisting of piles,
timbers, &c., whereby the access to the water was cut off.

The plea admitted doing the acts charged, and justified them,
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by virtue of the legislative authority contained in the charter of
the defendants. The provision relied on gave defendants power
"to lay out, construct, and run their railroad along the Passaic
river, from the village of Belleville to any point in the city of
Newark, at or near Governeur street, and to acquire the rights of
the shore owners in the manner prescribed in the charter of said
company in other cases, and may extend said road over said river;
and for that purpose may construct and maintain a bridge from
some convenient point in the city of Newark, at or near Governeur street,

*

*

*

*

and the said Paterson and Newark

Railroad Company may continue said railroad at the distance of
not less than one hundred and fifty feet eastwardly of the river
road or highway, and connect the same with any other railroad
or railroads on the east side of said river, on such terms as may
be agreed upon, and may lay out and construct the same, passing
under or over the Morris and Essex Railroad, by a suitable bridge
or arched passage-way."

*

*

*

*

The defendants claimed that this clause gave them the right to
lay their road along the river below high-water mark, as such
lands belonged to the state.
The plaintiff demurred to this plea, and the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer.
Parker J.Keasbey, for plaintiff in error.
Abiel & _relinghuysen, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEASLEY, C. J.-The principal question which has been argued
in this case is that respecting the interest of the state in the lands
lying between high and low water marks in tidal rivers. In some
of its aspects this subject is a familiar one to our courts ; but on
this occasion the point is for the first time distinctly presented,
whether it is competent for the legislature to grant the soil under
the water so as to cut off the riparian owner from the benefit incident to his property from its contiguity to the water.
Notwithstanding the apparent scepticism of counsel upon the
subject, I am constrained to think that some of the matters which
were handled in the discussion before the court are to be considered as at rest. In my opinion it is entirely indisputable that
the proprietors of New Jersey did not, under the grant from the

RAILROAD CO. v. STEVENS.

Duke of York, take any property in the soil of navigable rivers
within the ebb and flow of the tides. This was the very point of
decision in Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Hal. 1; Martin v. Waddell, 16
Pet. 367; and Russell v. Jersey Co., 15 How. 426.
Second. That this title to the soil under navigable water, which
the common law of England placed in the king, was transferred
by the revolution to the people of this state. The cases above
cited completely establish this proposition.
And lastly, in the case of Gough v. Bell, 2 Zab. 441, it was
declared that the owner of lands along the shore of tide-waters
could extend his improvements by wharves, and filling up over
the shore in front of 'his lands to low-water mark, unless prevented
by the state, provided he did it so as not to interfere injuriously
with navigation.
Thus far I regard the law in this state as founded on adjudications which ought not to be questioned, and which cannot be disturbed. Assuming then, as I do, the foregoing propositions as
stated, in the discussion now.before the court, the point of inquiry
is narrowed to the single question which was regarded as left
open in the case last cited, viz.: whether the owner of lands on
tide-water has such a right to the use of the water that the state
cannot authorize any improvement in front of his lands, which
will destroy or abridge that right without compensation.
In the discussion of this topic, I will consider briefly, first, the
rights, so called, of the riparian proprietor, and in the second
place, the rights of the state over the sea shore. First then, -kith
regard to the rights of the owner of the upland. In the case of
Gough v. Bell in this court, I observe that Mr. Justice NEvIus
and Mr. Justice POTTS put their opinion on the ground that the
riparian owner, at common law, was invested with certain rights
in the water as appurtenant to his estate. And in the case of
Gould v. The Hudson River Railroad Company, 2 Seld. 544,
Mr. Justice EDMONDS, in a dissenting opinion, expresses a similar
view. I have not found that any other judge has ever based a
decision on such a ground. The theory on which these opinions
are founded seems to me the result of misconception. The riparian
proprietor has a right, says Mr. Justice POTTS, "though his strict
legal title is bounded by the high-water line, to the water as
appurtenant to the upland, a right of towing on the banks, of landing, lading and unlading, a right of way to the shore, a right to
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draw seines upon the upland and of erecting fishing huts," &c.,
has the right of fishery, of ferry, and every other which is properly
appendant to the owner of the soil; and he holds every one of
them by as sacred a tenure as he holds the land from which they
emanate. The error in this statement arises from overlooking the
.fact that some of the rights enumerated belong to the riparian
proprietor as a member of the community, and that others of
them belong.to him in his character of owner of the soil. Not
one of the privileges in the water which are ascribed to him emanate from his ownership of the land. In common with every
other citizen, he can fish in the water, and pass and repass to
and from the water along the shore. But he has not these rights
by virtue of his property; they attach to him as an individual,
and he holds them in common with other citizens. They are part
rerum communium. Then again, it is true, it is lawful for him
to land on the bank, and to dry his nets, and to build fishing
huts there. But the right to do these things, and which are not
privileges in the water, appertain to him in the ordinary way as
the owner of -the land. The case is merely this: the man who
owns the land next to navigable water is more conveniently
situated for the enjoyment of the public easement than the rest
of the community. But a mere enumeration of the advantages
of that position falls far short of showing that such proprietor
has in the jus publiewm, by the common law, more or higher
rights than others. It will be observed that in the sentences above
quoted, it is averred that the rights referred to emanate from the
ownership of the soil. This is certainly true as to certain of them,
such as the right to erect fishing huts, &c., but with respect to the
usufruct of the water being appendant to the land in any legal
sense whatever, that is the point to be proved, and it is simply
assumed. The question is one of mere tradition, precedent, and
ancient authority. When and by whom was it ever claimed from
the days of Bracton to the present time, that the ownership of
the upland drew to it any right in the seashore or in a peculiar
use of the water? In the opinion commented on, no common-law
authority is cited, and the few American cases referred to are so
manifestly misapplied that it is not necessary to subject them to
criticism. My examination has been so thorough, that I feel
confidence in saying, that none of the ancient authorities can befound, and they, of necessity, must be our guides in this inquiry,
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which give countenance to the notion that any such privileges as
those claimed, are appurtenant to the bank, or edge of navigable
water. Indeed, so far has the bank owner been from making
claim to any peculiar privileges of this kind, that the reverse has
occurrpd, and the contested question has been, whether his land
for the convenience of the public, was not subject to certain servitudes; whbther such land might not be crossed in going to and
returning from the water; whether the right to tow boats along
the bank, or to land, or to dry nets upon it? These and similar
questions have been mooted in the courts, some of which remain
unsolved to the present day, while others have been decided,
though not without- hesitation and difficulty, in favor of the
riparian proprietor. In all these controversies, eitending from
ancient through modern times, I do not find that it was ever even
suggested that, as an incident to his estate, the Qwner of the
terra firma along the line of tide-water, was possessed of any
peculiar privilege, with the exception of those of alluvion and
derelictum, which are, perhaps, countervailed by the loss to which
he is subject from the washing away of his land.
That this is the true position of the landowner at the common
law, will, I think, more cleatly appear, when I come to set forth
the rights of the king in the seashore, to which subject I now
proceed. The language of the old books is that "the sea is the
king's proper inheritance," and he is styled "the Lord of the
Great Waste," "tam aque quam soh": Coke upon Litt. 107,
260 b; Colles 17; 2 Molloy 375. And this was property susceptible of transference. There are some antique instances of
grants by kings of England of certain portions of land under the
sea. Lord Hale recites several transfers of this description:
Hale de Jure Mars, p. 14-28. It is true that such conveyances,
at least in modern times, did not pass the property disencumbered
of the public rights of navigation and fishing; but still it is clear
that the tenure of the soil carried with it certain valuable rights.
In fact it appears to have been possessed of the ordinary incidents
of property on terrafirma. It could be put to any use not inconsistent with the public easements with which it was burthened.
If it was unlawfully appropriated or interfered with, the law
afforded it protection. There are cases both ancient and modern,
showing that this districtus mas-this land covered with water,
was a property susceptible of valuable uses. Thus in the cele-
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brated case of The 1?oyal Pishery in the Banne, Davies Rep. 149,
it is said, "The city of London, by a charter from the king, hath
the river Thames granted to them; but because it was 'conceived
that the soil and ground of the river did not pass by that grant,
they purchased another charter by which the king graited to
them solum et fundum of the said river: by force of which grant
the city to this day reserves rents of those who fix posts, or make
wharves, or other edifices on the soil of said xiver." It cannot
fail to be observed, how entirely this case explodes the assumption that the riparian proprietor has any common-law right to
extend his front, either by filling in or by the erection of a wharf.
Such acts would have been trespasses on the private property of
the sovereign. The modern case illustrative of the same subject,
to which I will particularly refer, is that of the Attorney--eneral
v. Cliambers, 4 De Gex, M. & Gordon 206. This was an information against certain owners and lessees of a district abutting on
the seashore. The information alleged that by the royal prerogative the sea-shore and the soil, and all mines and minerals
lying under the sea, and all profits arising therefrom, belong to
her majesty, &c. That there were very valuable veins or strata
of coal lying under that part of said~district which was contiguous
to the seashore; that the seashore vested in her majesty, extended
landwards as far as high-water mark in ordinary spring tides, or,
at all events, far beyond high-water mark at neap tides, and that
the defendants had encroached upon and worked valuable mines
under the shore. The general right of the queen as stated was
admitted, the only question which was put in controversy being
as to the extent of such right. A verdict was taken by consent
for the crown, and the court decided that the right of her majesty
to the seashore landwards is, primd facie, limited by the line of
the medium high tide between the spring and neap tides. This
decision was made in the year 1854. From these two cases, it
seems to me to be most conspicuous, that the ownership of the
shore under the sea drew to it all the usual rights of property.
It could be leased out for wharves or worked as a coal mine. We
are also to bear in mind, that the seashore could be granted in
gross, that is, without being parcel of the upland: Hall on the
rights of the Crown, &c., p. 19. I also refer, for a number of
examples in which claims of the crown similar to the foregoing
have been successfully enforced,- to an article in Vol. VI., p. 99,
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of the Law Magazine and Law Review. From the essay it
appears that "the advisers of the crown for the last quarter of a
century have exercised unusual vigilance respecting, and been
most active in realizing the royal claims to the foreshores."
Among other suitable instances, the following one is thus described:
"An earlier case was one of an information for intrusion filed in
1833, by Sir William Home, when Attorney-General, in the Court
of Exchequer to establish the right of the crown to a tract of
land containing about two hundred and seventy acres, formerly
overflowed by the tide, situate near the city of Chester, on the
south bank of the Dee, a tidal navigable river. The suit terminated
in favor of the crowi, and the land was subsequently sold by the
crown." Nor do I find this royal right anywhere ii the long line
of adjudications, upon the subject, called in question. With respect to the general features it is admitted in the fullest extent in
the conspicuous modern cases: Lord Advocate v. Sinclair of Toss,
L. R. 1 Scotch Appeals 174; and Cann v. The Free Fishers of
Whitstable, 11 House of Lords Cases 192. Indeed I think it is
safe to say that no English lawyer, speaking either from the
bench or bar, has ever asserted that the owner of the land
along the shore of navigable water has any peculiar right by
reason of such property to use of the water or of the shore. And
it seems entirely incredible to suppose that such a right as this
could have existed, and that no allusion should have ever been
made to it. It is obvious that many of the controversies which
have been before the courts would have been largely affected by
the existence of such a right. Such would have been the effect
in the case of The -Duke of Bucoleuch v. The Metropolitan Board
of Wors, the report of which has done hard service in the argument on the present occasion: L. R. 5 Exch. 221. The facts
of the case are thus stated: The Duke of Buccleuch, the plaintiff,
had a certain interest under a lease and two agreements from the
crown in a mansion in Parliament street, the back of which was
parallel to and bounded by the river Thames; and the Metropolitan Board of Works, the defendants, had constructed, by
force of an Act of Parliament; an embankment between the back
of the plaintiff's premises and the river. For the purpose of this
construction the Board of Works had found it necessary to
remove the area or mass of water which formerly used to run at
the back of the premises between high and low water marks, and
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also to take away a causeway or jetty running from the foot of
some stairs on the plaintiff's land across the shore to low-water
mark.
It will be observed that the facts of this case were, in all
essential particulars, the same as those embraced in the -one now
before this court, with the exception that in the reported case the
plaintiff had a jetty or causeway extending from his land to lowwater mark. The act under which the defendants had erected
their embankment required, where land was taken, compensation
to be made, and directed that in estimating the purchase-money
or compensation to be paid by the promoters "regard should be
had" not only to the value of the land to be purchased, but also
to the damage, if any, to be sustained by the owner of the lands
by reason of the severing of the lands taken from the other lands
of such owner, or otherwise injuriously affecting such other lands
by the exercise of the powers, &c. The plaintiff's claims for compensation were two-fold: first, for the destruction of the jetty or
landing place; and, second, for the taking away of the water
which used to flow along the river side of the premises. The
court held that the only claims the plaintiff was entitled to were
those resulting from the destruction of the jetty or landing place,
but that the general damage occasioned by the interposition of
the embankment of the defendants along the water front of the
premises, were claimed absque injuria. This was regarded as a
case of great importance, and was fully argued and considered,
and yet it was not intimated, either by counsel or any of the parties, that the plaintiff, as riparian proprietor, had any right the
deprivation of which was a legal injury, or afforded even any just
ground for complaint. In the whole case there is not a hint of
the supposed existence of such a right.
From these authorities, and many others which might be cited,
it appears to me to be plain that by the rules of the ancient law
the owner of land along the shore was entitled to no right as an
incident of such ownership except the contingent ones before referred to of alluvion and derelictum; and that, on the other hand,
the title to the soil under tide-water was in the sovereign, and that
such title was attended with the usual concomitants of the ownership of realty. And it consequently followed, from other results,
that in order to enable the owner of the upland to fill in or wharf
out below the line of high water it was absolutely necessary to
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adopt some principle different from those of the common law. And
this, as I understand, was the foundation on which the majority in
this court placed themselves in the decision of the case of Gough v.
Bell. That final decision was a concurrence in the view expressed
by Chief Justice GREEN in his opinion delivered in the Supreme
Court, and that view was, as I apprehend, the only one which
could invest the claim of the landowner to extend his lands by
artificial means below the line of high water with the faintest substance of legality. As such claim could not rest on the common
law, it was indisputable to invoke and sanction a custom or local
usage variant from the common law. How far such a custom, as
a mode of acquiring a title to real estate, has been made to harmonize with legal principles it is not necessary to inquire, for, as
before remarked, I consider the existence and legality of such a
usage to be res adjudicata in this state. Admitting its legal existence, then, the inquiry presses as to its effect in law. It confers
a right by the legal exercise of which, the bank owner may encroach on the public property between high and low water marks.
If such a right existed by force of the common law as an incident
6f property, it is obvious it could not be destroyed or substantially
injured by the legislative power, without compensation. The
question is whether this customary right has the same quality and
efficiency as. though it appertained to the land by force of the
common law. A consideration of this branch of the subject has
led to the conviction that such privilege has not the effect suggested in the above inquiry. The local custom in question was
nothing more than a license on the part of the public to the landowner enabling the latter to fill in or wharf out along the foreshore between high and low water marks, and which license when
executed became irrevocable. The shore-owner acquired his
indefeasible right by the acquiescence of the public in the performance of the act. That this was the view of the judges whose
opinions prevailed in the decision of Gough v. Bell, is, in truth,
clearly manifest. I have above observed that the true doctrine
with respect to this local custom is embodied in the opinion read
by Chief Justice GREEN in the Supreme Court. In that opinion
this clear statement with respect to the necessity of the execution
of the license as pre-requisite to the acquisition of a- legal right
on the part of the landowner, is to be found, viz.: "In New
Jersey, as we have seen, the title of the state extends as at com-
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maon law to high-water mark as it actually exists. Where these
waters have receded by alluvion or by the labor of the adjoining
proprietor the title of the land does not extend beyond the actual
high-water line. That every encroachmentupon the shore or other
part of the public domain must at all times be restricted or controlled by the legislature, is admitted. That any erection prejudicial to the common rights of navigation or fishery may be abated,
is not denied. But in the absence of such legislative restriction,
where no nuisance is created the riparian proprietor may appropriate the shore between high and low water mark to his own
use.'! This language is too clear and explicit to need explanatory comment. That the local customs of the state which are
recognised and enforced by the court, operated as a simple license
to the riparian owner to enlarge his possession at the expense of
the public domain, and which license was revocable at any time
before execution, is the clear doctrine of the adjudication in question. It has no reach beyond this, and from that time to the
present I do not perceive that the judiciary of this state have
been in any doubt upon this subject, and whenever the doctrine
has been referred to, the question has been treated as being entirely at rest. In the year 1856, in the case of The State v.
Mayor and Common Council of Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 525, certain lands lying under the flow of the tide were thrown out of a
tax assessment for tlie reason that the title to rent lands was in
the state, and Mr. Justice ELMER, with characteristic directness
of expression, defines the public right thus: It must now be
accepted as the established law in New Jersey that the right of
the owner of lands bounding on a navigable river extends only to
the actual high-water mark, and that all below that mark belongs
to the state. The inchoate right, if such it may be called, which
the proprietor of the upland has'either with or without a license
to acquire an exclusive right to the property, by wharving out or
otherwise improving the same, gives him no property in the land
while it remains under the water. It may be granted by the State
to a stranger at any time before it is actually reclaimed and annexed to the upland. Such is unquestionably the common law,
and I am aware of no alteration of it in this respect in New
Jersey." In this opinion Chief Justice GREEN, Justices OGDEN
and HAINES, concurred.
Again, after an interval of several years, the rule was treated
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by the same court as established. I refer to the case of
Stewart v. Fitch . Boynton, 2 Vro'om 18. This was a suit by a
riparian owner for the use of certain flats, by the rafts and lumber of the defendants, and among other reasons given for dissent
to the legality of the plaintiff's claim, the court said, "but it also
appears that the flats on which the rafts were anchored were all
below high-water mark, and at high tide covered to the depth of
two feet, and that no part had been in any wise improved or
reclaimed, and that consequently the title to them was not in the
plaintiff, but in the state of New Jersey." From these cases I
think it evident that from the date of the decision of Gough v.
Bell, up to the time of the present controversy, the question
now under consideration has not been considered an open one by
the courts of this.state. And such too appears to have been the
legislative and public understanding of the effect of this leading
decision, just mentioned at the time that it was rendered. This
I think is manifest.from other, provisions of the Act of 1851, entitled "An Act to authorize the owners of lands upon tide-waters
to build wharves in front of the same." Nix. Dig. 1025. By the
first section of the act it is declared, "That" it shall be lawful for
the owner of lands situate along or upon tide-waters to build
docks or wharves upon the shore in front of his lands, and in any
other way to improve the same, and when so built upon or improved to appropriate the same to his own exclusive use." Thus
we find in thisprovision, and in similar provisions, in many other
laws, the local custom, sanctioned in the case of Gough v. Bell,
assuming a statutory form and subjected to certain general restrictions. The right of the bank-owner was dealt with by the
legislature not as an incident of property already vested, but as
a privilege which required the element of public acquiescence and
the performance of a pre-requisite on the side of the proprietor
to be converted into a legal right. Nor should it fail to beobserved that even if we were to admit the indefeasibility of this
customary right of the shore-owner, such concession could not
have much effect in securing him against the exercise of legislative power. By force of such a doctrine the land lying between
the high and low water lines could not be taken from him without compensation, but below the low-water line the public right
and contract would be still absolute. But I have said such concession cannoebe made. The bank-owner has by the local custom
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of the state, but an inchoate right before the reclamation of the
land below the water; nor does he gain anything in this respect
by the statute just referred to. That act did not add anything
to the efficiency of the local custom as a mode of acquiring title.
It left that right as it found it, a pure license revocable before
execution. Such acts bearing the form of legislative licenses are
not uncommon, and their effect has been clearly defined. It has
never been thought that the privileges conferred by them were
vested rights in the sense of debarring the public from revoking
them at pleasure.
Two cases in point, which have arisen in Pennsylvania, I will
refer to as illustrative of the principle. By a statute of that state
all persons owning lands adjoining navigable streams were authorized to erect dams in such streams, and appropriate the water to
the uses of their mills. In the cases of The 8usquehanna Cdnal
Compoany v. Wright, 9 Watts & Serg. 9, and The New Yorkc &
.Erie Railway v. Young, 38 Penna. 175, it was declared that the
rights acquired under this act were not indefeasible, but were
subordinate to the rights of the commonwealth. This result was
justified by the theory that such licenses took their privileges
under the implied condition that they should be held in subordination to the requirements of the public. These decisions go to the
point that a legislative permission to appropriate to individual
use a part of the jus publicum does not, per se, deprive the public of a right to resume the privilege granted, unless it appears
that it was the intention to vest such privileges irrevocably in the
licensee. The wharf act in this state clearly leaves, in this respect,
nothing in doubt, for it expressly announces that after the riparian proprietor has, in point of fact, erected his wharf or made
any other improvement below the high-water line, then, and not
till then, the land so appropriated shall become his own. Prior to
this event he has no rights in the water or the land under it either
by the statute or by the local custom which are not subservient to
the legislative will.
The steps which I have thus far taken have led me to this
position: that all navigable waters within the territorial limits
of the state and the soil under such waters, belong in actual propriety to the public; that the riparian owner, by the common law,
has no peculiar rights in this public domain as incidents of his
estates; and that the privileges he possesses by t,_local custom
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or by force of the Wharf Act, to acquire such rights, can, before
possession has been taken, be regulated or revoked at the will
of the legislature.
The result is that there is no legal obstacle to a grant by the
legislature to the defendants of that part of the property of the
public which lies in front of the lands of the plaintiff, and which
is below high-water mark. It may be true that by such an appropriation the plaintiff will sustain a greater inconvenience than
will other citizens whose land does not run along this river. But
the injury to all is in its essence and character the same, the difference being only in degree. All persons who have occasion to
approach this river over that part of the bank occupied by the
railroad of the defendants may, perhaps, experience some inconvenience from the interposition of such works: the railroad therefore is somewhat of an impediment to the public rights of fishery
and navigation. But no one, it is presumed, will pretend that
such impediment is on that account illegal, if authorized by the
legislative authority. Nor can the plaintiff complain because a
difficult access to the water is a greater hardship to him, owing to
the easy use of the water in connection with his property in its
natural condition, than it is to those who live at a distance from it.
If it were true that no public improvement can be made which,
in its execution, will affect the property of one citizen more injuriously than it will that of another, many of the greatest works
of the times would become impossible. No railroad or canal
can be constructed which will not greatly benefit the lands of
some persons, and injure, almost as greatly, those of others.
Every citizen is required, at times, to contribute something, by
way of sacrifice, to the public good. Such partial evil is the
price which is paid for the advantages incident to the social state.
It is not necessary to refer extensively to authority in confirmation of the doctrine that, as a general rule, the public domain is
subject altogether to the control of the legislature, and that incidental damage resulting to individuals from the exercise of such
control gives no legal claim to compensation. The principle seems
universally conceded that, unless in certain particulars provided
by the Federal Constitution, the public rights in navigable rivers
can, to any extent, be modified or absolutely destroyed by statute.
By force of the constitution of this state private property cannot
be taken, even for public use, without just compensation.' But
VOL. XIX.-12
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the dominion of the legislature over the jura publica appears to
be unlimited. By this power they can be regulated, abridged, or
vacated. We have seen that, by the common law, the king was
the proprietor of the soil under the navigable water, and this
being regarded as a private emolument of the crown was susceptible of transfer to a subject. But such transfer did not divest
or diminish, at least after Magna Carta, the public rights in the
water; and, consequently, the grantee of the crown held the
property in subjection to the common privilege of fishery and
navigation. The consequence was that the king could not deprive the subjects of the realm of these general rights. This was
a power that resided in Parliament, and not in the monarch. But
that such a parliamentary power existed, appears never to have
been questioned by any English authority, nor do I perceive that
its exercise was ever regarded as a legal wrong, or even as an unusual hardship to the owner of the land along the shore. In the
year 1780 this authority of Parliament to put to use the land
under tide-water, thus intercepting the landowner, was fully recognised by Lord MANsFIELD. The case referred to is that of The
King v. Smith, Douglass 441. The city of London, under an
act in the time of George the Third, had erected piles in the bed
of the Thames, near Richmond, within high-water mark, about
the distance of 29 feet from the shore, for the purpose of making
a towing-path for horses adjoining and contiguous to a wharf in
the possession and the property of the defendants or of those
under whom they claimed. The defendants cut down one of these
piles which was proved to have been erected between the high and
low water marks opposite to the said wharf. For this act an
indictment was found and the defendants were convicted. The
case came before the court on a motion to arrest judgment. In
the argument of the case none of the distinguished counsel employed for the defence questioned the right of Parliament to
appropriate the land in question in the manner specified, if the
wharves, at the point in question, were within the reach of the tide,
the entire predication being that such was not the fact. The conviction was sustained. I think the power of Parliament in affairs
of this character is not to be denied. Nor was this one of those
severe prerogatives which existed only in consequence of the
theoretic omnipotence of the legislative branch of the British
government. Whatever the theory, we know what the practice
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has been, and it is scarcely too much to say that, since the days
of the revolution, no instance can be found of any Englishmen
being deprived of any right of property by Act of Parliament. A
statute putting to use the land under tide-water was regarded as
legitimate, not because the power of Parliament was unlimited,
but because the control over the public domain was unlimited.
And in fact the absence of a power to control and put to use
the public interests in the navigable waters would be an imperfection in the civil polity of any people. I do not find that it
has ever been supposed that such a power did not exist in any of
the American states. By a statute of the state of Delaware a
citizen was authorized, for the purpose of improving his lands, to
close the mouth of a navigable creek, and such statute was pronounced to be constitutional, and the act done under it, legal, by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Wilson v. Black Bird
Creek, 2 Pet. 245. In Glover v. Powell,2 Stock. 211, a similar law
was enforced, and in the case of The Mayor of Georgetown v. The
Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91, it was held competent for
Congress, acting as the local legislature, to authorize the erection
of the canal in question, although the same was admitted to be
injurious to the interests of the riparian owners. This same doctrine was enforced in the case of Gould v. .fudeon _ailroad Co.,
12 Barb. 616, 2 Seld. 522, on a scale of the greatest magnitude,
*the road of the defendants being located along the Hudson, and
intervening for many miles between the water and the land of
the bank-owners. See a collection of cases to the same effect in
Angell on Tide-waters 92-108. It is upon this principle that
water in large quantities is taken from our rivers to feed our canals,
and that dams are placed to the destruction of navigation in our
rivers for the use of manufactories. Our state affords many
instances of a display of this power in this form. With regard
to the hardships oftentimes incident to the exercise of such a
power the courts can have no concern, such considerations address
themselves exclusively to the law-makers. It is the office of the
court to declare if the law leads to such result that the legislalature has the authority to regulate or destroy, at pleasure and
for the common welfare, the public rights in navigable rivers, and
that if individuals are, in consequence thereof, incidentally injured,
such loss is damnum absque injuria. If compensation be made
for such damage it is on the part of the state a mere gratuity,
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for neither the riparian proprietor nor any other citizen whose
property has been impaired can claim such redress as a matter
of legal right. In all such cases the appeal must be to the sense
of justice of the legislature.
The result being that the legislature can authorize the laying
of this road in front of the land of the plaintiff, without compensation, the next question is, has such a privilege been conferred
on the defendants. The claim is that the legislature has granted
to these defendants the use of a part of the public domain. The
state is never presumed to have parted with any part of its property in the absence of conclusive proof of an intention to do so.
Such proof must exist either in express terms or in necessary
implications. I shall not cite authorities to sustain so familiar a
proposition. With respect to this statute now drawn in question,
and by the supposed force of which the defendants have erected
their works, I fully concur in the view expressed by Mr. Justice
DEPuE, in the opinion read by him in the Circuit Court. I
think there are no terms used in this statute which, fairly interpreted, imply an intention to confer on the defendants the privilege asserted, nor does such privilege necessarily result from the
general powers conferred. This plea, therefore, presents no bar
to the action of the plaintiff.
With respect to the question raised in the argument touching
the sufficiency of the facts stated in the plaintiff's declaration. to
sustain his suit, I will merely say that it seems to me that a legal
cause of action is shown. The substantial allegation is that in
consequence of the works of the defendants he is prevented from
passing from his land to the river Passaic, which at present is a
public highway. Now it is true, that as the defendants have put
these obstructions in this river without authority of law, such
obstructions are a public nuisance. But I think it is a nuisance
which, according to the allegations on the record, inflicts a peculiar
damage on the plaintiff, and if that be so it is admitted this action
is well brought. The plaintiff, until the state interferes and
deprives him of the privilege, has the right to pass directly froli
his property on to the shore of this navigable river. He has been
deprived of the right by the tort of the defendants, and this is a
damage which apparently is individual and peculiar to himself.
If a ditch should be dug in a public highway in front of the door of
a dwelling-house, so as to cut off access to and from such house,
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no one would doubt that the occupier of such house sustained a
greater inconvenience from the public nuisance than the b6dy of
the community. The character of the present tort as it respects
the plaintiff is precisely of this nature. I think the facts stated
supported the action.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
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Money paid by a debtor to his creditor more than four months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy by or against such debtor, cannot be
recovered back from such creditor by the assignee of the bankrupt, although the
creditor knew that such payment was made to him by way of preference, and that
the debtor was insolvent at the time of making such payment and that the same
was made in contemplation of insolvency or bankruptcy.
The two clauses of the 35th section of the Bankrupt Law differ in this, that the
first clause is limited to a creditor or a person having a claim against the bankrupt, or who is under liability for him, and who receives money or property by
way of preference; and the second clause applies to fhe purchase of property of
the bankrupt by any person who has no claim against him and is under no liability
for him.
The word "payment" in the first part of the second clause of this section is
used either inadvertently or in a loose sense with respect to some of the acts mentioned in this clause, but is intentionally omitted from the list of transactions
which are declared void under this clause of the section.
The 35th and 39th sections of the Bankrupt Act are not in conflict with respect
to this question. The latter section enumerates the various acts which subject a
person to involuntary bankruptcy, and that is the main purpose of the section, and
the fact that a preference, given by a debtor to a creditor within six months next
before the filing of the petition against him in contravention of the terms of this
section, is denounced as an act of bankruptcy; and that the money so paid may
be recovered back by the assignee, is not inconsistent with the limitation of the
right in the 35th section to cases occurring within six and four months of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.
The 35th and 39th sections having set up a rule at variance with the common
law and with the statutes of most of the states, by which certain payments and
transfers of property are declared void, very properly limit and define the circumstances within which this new rule should operate.

THIS was a writ of error to the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
The plaintiff in error brought his suit to recover, as assignee
of the bankrupt, the sum of $1436 paid to the defendants within
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six months, but not within four months before the filing of the
petition under which the bankruptcy 'was established. The declaration contained two counts, intended to cover the two clauses of
the thirty-fifth section of the bankrupt law, in one of which the
transaction was described as a payment in liquidation of an existing debt, and in the other it was alleged to have been made to
defendants as creditors of the bankrupt with intent to give a
preference. In both counts the insolvency of the bankrupt at the
time of the transaction was alleged, and also knowledge or notice
of said fact on the part of defendants, and that it was within six
months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Demurrers were filed to both counts by defendants, which were
sustained by the District Court, and this ruling was the error
assigned.
B. T. Allen, for plaintiff.

G. M. Stewart, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
S. F. MILLER, Circuit Judge.-The determination of the question here presented necessarily involves a construction of section
35 of the bankrupt law, or rather the two first clauses, which are
in the following words:
"And be it further enacted, That if any person, being insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, within four months before
the filing of the petition by or against him, with a view to give
a preference to any creditor or person having a claim against him,
or who is under any liability for him, procures any part of his property to be attached, sequestered, or seized on execution, or makes
any payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance, of any
part of his property, either directly or indirectly, absolutely or
conditionally-the person receiving such payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, or by
such attachment, having reasonable cause to believe such person
is insolvent, and that such attachment, payment, pledge, assignment, or conveyance is made in fraud of the provisions of this
act-the same shall be void, and the assignee may recover the
property, or the value of it, from the person so receiving it, or so
to be benefited.
"And if any person being insolvent, or in contemplation of
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insolvency or bankruptcy, within six months before the Ofilng of
the petition by or against him, inakes any payment, sale, assignment, transfer, conveyance, or any disposition of any part of his
property to any person who then had reasonable cause to believe
him to be insolvent, or to be acting in contemplation of insolvency,
and such payment, sale, assignment, transfer, or other conveyance
is made with a view to prevent his property from coming to his
assignee in bankruptcy, or to prevent the same from being distributed under this act, or to defeat the object of, or in any
way impair, hinder, impede, or delay the operation and effect of,
or to evade any of the provisions of this act, the sale, assignment,
transfer, or conveyance shall 11e void, and the assignee may recover
the property or the value thereof, a's assets of the bankrupt. And
if such sale, assignment, transfer, or conveyance is not made in
the usual and ordinary course of business of the debtor, the fact
shall be primd facie evidence of fraud."
'And we commence the'eiamination into the true meaning of the
section in its application to the question before us by affirming
what I am told was 'held in tisi sa'me'c'ourt atthelst'term,
namely: that the two clauses differ mainly im their application to
two different classes of recipienis of the baukrupt's property or
means. Xiat is to say, that he first cause is ited toa reditor,
or person having a'claIm against the bankrupt s or
Iho
is under
any liability for him, anIq who receives the money or propert by
way of preference"; and toe second clause applies t6 ihe purchase
of property of tte bankrupt by any erson w 'hs no claim
against him, and is under no liability for him. That the irst
clause is confined to persons of that character named, cannot well
be doubted, since thd acts 'therein mentioned are' actis done with
persons of that character, anjd must be done with
Fview
to giving
such a person a preference over others of the same class.' That the
second clause has reference to 'another class of persons and is
governed by other rules seems to be strongly sustained by these
considerations. 1. The sale or other transfer of property mentioned in it need not be in preference of a credi'or or person
liable for the bankrupt, to render it void. 2. Ii need xiot be
made to a' person' of that character. 3'. In the*rst clause the
transfer may stl be vaid, although within all other conaitions
of .the clause, if made more than four months before Ahe filing
of a petition in bankruptcy, while' the transfer described in the
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second clause requires that it shall have been made more than si
months before the filing of the petition to have the same effect.
These are sufficient reasons to justify our conviction that the
two clauses apply to transfers to two different classes of persons
dealing with the bankrupt.
It is objected to this view that in the second clause "payment"
is one of the acts described, as well as in the first, and that the
word necessarily implies a transaction between debtor and
creditor.
The force of this objection is fully met by the language of that
part of the section which makes void the acts against which it is
directed, and which while declaring that such "sale, assignment,
transfer, or conveyance shall be void, and the assignee may
recover the property, or the value thereof," omits to make any
such provision as to "payment," while in the invalidating language of the first clause that is the first word used.
The word payment may have been used in the second clause
inadvertently, or in a loose sense, to include some consideration
advanced by the insolvent in some one of the transactions otherwise forbidden, but, however it came to be used, it is quite certain that it is intentionally omitted when the transactions are mentioaed which are declared to be void.
The payment described in both counts of this declaration is not
one covered by the second clause of the section. It is a payment
of money to a creditor on account of an existing debt, and is a
preference within the meaning of the law. It is clearly .one of
the transactions described in, and forbidden by the first clause,
and therefore not included within the second. We need therefore inquire no further concerning the relation to the latter.
In regard to the first clause, both counts would be good under
that if they contained the averment that the transactions described
took place within four months before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. But, this allegation cannot be truthfully made, and
the principal question in this case is, whether this is necessary to
make the count good.
The language of the section is, that "if any person being insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, within four months of
the filing of the petition by or against him, with a view to give
the creditor a preference," do any of the acts therein mentioned,
the act shall be void, and the assignee may recover the property
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from the person receiving it, if such person had reasonable cause
to believe the party insolvent. It is very certain that 'the act
described is not made void by this clause, or by any clause in this
section, unless it was done within four months of the filing of a
petition by or against the bankrupt, and it is as strong an instance
as can well grow out of a negative pregnant, that no such act is
void for any of the causes there mentioned, that was not done
within the four months.
In opposition to this view of the subject, it is earnestly contended that one of the clauses of the thirty-ninth section of the
act describes pretty nearly in the same language the acts mentioned in the thirty-fifth section, and concludes that section with
the declaration that if the person doing such acts, shall be
declared bankrupt, the assignee may recover the property transferred, contrary to the provisions of the statute, making no restriction as to time. And that the two sections can only be reconciled in this regard by holding that the special provisions of
section thirty-five are to be taken as a rule of evidence not
imperative but primd facie, that the transaction was fraudulent
if within the period therein mentioned.
Having thus stated the opposite opinions of this thirty-fifth
section, maintained by counsel, I do not know that I can do
better than to state my own views of the policy which governed
Congress in its adoption.
The acts mentioned in the sections are not such as were forbidden by the common law, or generally by the statutes of the
states. Nor are they acts which in their essential nature are
immoral or dishonest. For a man who is insolvent, or approaching insolvency, to pay a just debt is not morally wrong, nor was
it forbidden by any law in this country previous to the bankrupt
act. And though a preference of creditors by transfer or assignment of property by an insolvent may sometimes be unjust to the
other creditors, it was not forbidden by many of the states.
It is very certain that such a preference may consist with the
highest obligations of morality, and under circumstances which
any one can imagine, it may be the dictate of the purest justice
in reference to all concerned. The careful and diligent framers
of the bankrupt act were fully aware of all that has just been
said. But they were about to frame a system of law, one main
feature of which was to provide for the distribution of the pro-
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perty of an insolvent debtor among his creditors; and they
adopted wisely, as the general and pervading rule of distribution,
equality among creditors. But they found that this general principle could not, without hardship, be made of universal application ; when a creditor had obtained by fair means a lien on any
property of the bankrupt, that lien ought to be respected. If
he had so obtained payment of the whole, or a part of his debt,
the payment ought to stand. These exceptions to the general
rule of distribution were, however, liable to be abused, and might
be used to defeat the purposes of the bankrupt law. The bankrupt knowing that he must soon be helpless, would desire to pay
some favorite creditors. They, knowing his iiiability to pay,
and his liability to be called into a bankrupt court, would naturally desire to secure themselves at the expense of other creditors.
In this dilemma Congress sAid, We cannot prescribe any rule by
which preference would be held to be morally right or wrong, and
it would be fatal to the administration of the law of distribution to
permit such a question to be raised. We will, therefore, adopt a
conventional rule to determine the validity of these preferences.
In all cases where an insolvent pays or secures a creditor to the
exclusion of others, and that creditor is aware that it is so when he
receives it, he shall run the risk of the debtor's continuance in
business for four months. If the law which requires equal distribution is not called into action for four months, the transaction
being otherwise honest, shall stand, but if by the debtor himself,
or by any of his creditors, that law is invoked within four months,
the transaction shall not stand, but the money or property
received by the party shall become a part ofthe common fund for.
distribution.
Congress, in this view, seems also to have thought that in case
of a creditor who had parted with his money or property to the
insolvent party, and whose reasons for such further dealing with
him, were more pressing that he might be saved from an impending loss, the time which should secure the transaction from the
effect of the bankrupt law should be less by two months than in
the case of one who having no such incentive to action, became a
volunteer purchaser of an insolvent's property with knowledge of
his insolvency.
It is in a similar spirit that the provision in section 23, which
forbids a person accepting such a preference from sharing in the
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assets of the bankrupt, uses the qualifying phrase, "until he shall
first have surrendered to the assignee all that he had received
under such preference."
I do not see any necessary contradiction between section 39
and this view of section 35. The former section is a very long
one and recites all the acts which subject a person to involuntary
bankruptcy: and that is the main purpose of the section. Among
the acts which constitute a man a bankrupt are those of giving
preference to creditors in contemplation of bankruptcy. And it is
in the conclusion of that section declared in general terms that if
the debtor shall subsequently be declared a bankrupt, his assignee
may recover the money or other property, which was the subject
of the act of bankruptcy. But this general declaration of the
right of the assignee to recover is not inconsistent with the limitation of the right in another section to cases accruing within six
and four months of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. The general declaration of a state statute that a person
shall recover land by an action of ejectment, is not inconsistent
with the provision in the Sf'atute of Limitations that such actions
must be brought within ten years after they have accrued. Nor
is it inconsistent with the still more comprehensive right of suit
conferred on the assignee by the 14th section of the act.
The 35th section and the 39th section having for the first time
set up a rule by which certain payments and transfers of property
shall be declared void, a rule at variance w*ith common law and
with the statutes of the states, very properly limits and defines the
circumstances within which this new rule should operate. These
are, among others, that the recipients of the bankrupt's money or
property must have had reasonable cause to believe he was insolvent, and that the transaction must have been recent, when the
bankrupt law was applied to the case of a creditor within four
months, and of a general purchaser within six months. As to all
illegal and fraudulent transactions which are so by common law,
by statute law, or by any other recognised rule, other than these
special provisions of the bankrupt law, that act has imposed the
limitation of two years on the assignee, in bringing his suits, and
by that they are governed. But the case made by the plaintiff
does not come within any such law known to us.
Therefore his declaration is bad, and the demurrer was properly
sustained by the District Court, whose judgment is affirmed.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
PERRIN v. LYMAN'S ADMINISTRATOR.
- Ordinarily, an agent contracting in behalf of the government, or of the public,
is not personally bound by the contract.

A quartermaster in the army of the United States during the late rebellion
employed a person as a clerk, put his name on the government pay-rolls, with the
names of the other clerks of his department, and paid him $75 monthly out of the

funds of the United States, said clerk signing the usual vouchers.

He worked for

the government, and performed no service whatever for the quartermaster individually. Held, that the quartermaster was not personally liable to such clerk.
The law in force at the time the remedy is sought upon a contract governs as
to questigns of usury.
The provision of the Interest Law of 1867 (Acts 1867, p. 151); that " all interest

exceeding the rate of ten per centum per annum shall be deemed usurious and
illegal, as to the excess only, and in any action upon a contract affected by such
usury, such excess may be recouped by the defendant, whenever it has been
reserved or paid before the bringing of the suit," embraces contracts made before,

as well as those made after, the passage of said act.
THIS was a suit against the appellauit, on his promissory note
to the order of Charles W. Lyman for six hundred dollars with
interest at ten per cent.
The defendant, among other things, set up as a defence in his
answer, an account against the plaintiff's intestate in favor of
one Redfield, for services rendered by the latter in the quartermaster's department, from July 2"2d 1862 to February 24th 1863,
assigned by Redfield to the defendant before suit was commenced.
The evidence tended to show that Lyman was a quartermaster
in the army of the United States, during the late rebellion; that
as such he employed Redfield as a clerk, put his name on the
government " pay-roll," with the other clerks of his department,
and paid him monthly, out of the funds of the United States, the
sum of $75; that Redfield signed the usual vouchers, worked for
the government, and performed no services whatever for Lyman
individually, during the time he served as such clerk.
The court instructed the jury, that "If the United States was
at all liable to Redfield, the assignor of the account pleaded as a
set-off in this action, for the services performed by Redfield as
clerk in the quartermaster's department, said services being all
performed for the United States; and at the time he entered upon
the employment, Redfield agreed to enter into the employ of the
United States and receive his pay from the same, then the estate
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of Charles W. Lyman, the plaintiff in this action, is not liable to
the defendant, who is the assignee of Redfield, and the claim for
said services is not a proper set-off to the note sued on, unless the
agreement by Lyman, the decedent, with Redfield, to pay for said
services was in writing."
The court also instructed the jury, that the plaintiff was, under
the law, entitled to the rate of interest contracted for in the note.
The jury found for the plaintiff the amount due on the note,
computing interest at ten per cent., and disallowing Redfield's
account, whereupon the defendant appealed to this court.
L. .Barbour and C. P. Jacobs, for appellant.
G. IT Chapman and . S. Tareington, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GREGORY, J.-Lyman was at the time the services of Redfield
were rendered a public agent; this fact was known to Redfield;
there was no attempt to bind Lyman individually for these services. Redfield recognised the government as his paymaster.
If he was entitled to more than he received, certainly, under the
circumstances, Lyman was not personally liable to him therefor.
There is a distinction between public agents and those of a
private character, in respect to their personal liability. Ordinarily,
an agent contracting in behalf of the government, or of the public,
is not personally bound by such contract, because it is not to be
presumed, either that a public agent intends to bind himself personally, or that a party contracting with him in his public character means to rely upon his individual responsibility. See Hfodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345; Nichols v. Moody, 22 Barb. 611;
Belcnap v. _inehart, 2 Wend. 375.
It is claimed that the instruction was calculated to mislead the
jury. We do not think so. Under the proof, there was no
ground for claiming, that Lyman was individually liable to Redfield, and the court might have so told the jury.
The Act of larch 9th 1867, in force when this suit was commenced and tried, provides, that "1all interest exceeding the rate
of ten per centum per annum shall be deemed usurious and illegal,
as to the excess only, and in any action upon a contract affected
by such usury, such excess may be recouped by the defendant,
whenever it has been reserved or paid before the bringing of the
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suit." Acts 1867, p. 151, see. 2. This is as broad in its provisions
as sec. 29, ch. 31, of the Rev. Code of 1843, which was held by
this court, in Andrews v. Bussel, 7 Blackf. 474, to embrace contracts made before, as well as those made after, its passage.
Indeed, it has been repeatedly held by this court, that the law
in force at the time the remedy is sought must govern as to questions of usury.
In Rathburn v. Wheeler, 29 Ind. 601, it was held, where a
note was executed in 1861, on the face of which usurious interest
was included, and afterwards payments of usurious interest were
made thereon, in 1865 and 1866, and suit was brought on the
note after the Act of 1867, regulating interest, was passed and
went into force, that that act governed.
In Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, the learned jttdge delivering
the opinion of the court said, "The change made in the Interest
Law, then, by the Act of 1861, is mainly in relieving from penalties, or consequences in the nature of penalties, and is not one
impairing the obligation of the terms of the contract, but rather
enforcing or validating them. In such cases the law in force at
the time the remedy is sought upon the contract governs."
The court below committed no error in giving the instruction
asked by the plaintiff, or in refusing that asked by the defendant,
as to the rate of interest recoverable on the note.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

United States District Court, Eastern -Dist.of Pennsylvania.
Ix Rfl ANGIER.
A sale by an assignee under the Bankrupt Act, will not pass the real estate to
the vendee discharged of the dower of the bankrupt's wife.

A SALE was made by an assignee in bankruptcy of real estate
of the bankrupt. It was stated at the sale that the title should
be clear of all charge and encumbrances.
. On a motion to confirm the sale, an exception was filed by
the
purchaser, that the wife of the bankrupt if she survived him
would be entitled to dower.
a-eorge L. Crawford,for the exception.-The case is ruled in
principle by Eberle v. Fisher, 1 Harris 526. "

